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THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 








Corruption is a serious economic, social, political and moral blight, especially in many 
emerging countries. It is a problem that affects companies in particular, especially in 
international commerce, finance and technology transfer.
2 The economic effects of corruption 
are well known: it leads to inefficient use of resources; it discourages productive investment, 
above all foreign investment; it hampers economic growth and erodes the standard of living; it 
unfairly redistributes wealth and income to the detriment of the poor; it inflates public 
spending, makes the tax system less efficient and swells the public deficit; it destabilizes 
national budgets, encourages capital flight and creates perverse incentives that stimulate 
income-seeking rather than productive activities, in a negative-sum game.  
The social and political effects of corruption are no less pernicious: it undermines the rule of 
law and democracy; it endangers good government, efficient public administration and sound 
corporate governance; it distorts the markets; it threatens fundamental human rights and 
subverts the institutions that guarantee stability, security and sustainable development. Also, 
corruption tends to spread, from one agency to the next and from one company to the next, 
reaching out towards organized crime, mafias and money laundering.
3 
From the ethical point of view, corruption is a violation of vital principles of social and 
economic life. It gives rise to negative learning that makes its diffusion particularly insidious 
and the task of preventing and combating it more difficult. 
 
                                              
∗ Presented to the 19th Annual Conference of the European Business Ethics Network, EBEN “Ethics in and of Global 
Organizations”, Vienna, Austria, September 21
st-23
rd, 2006.  
1 This study is part of the work of the “la Caixa” Chair of Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Governance 
at IESE. I would like to thank Cristina Carrasquero for helping with information search and selection. 
2 Cf. Amundsen (1999), Argandoña (2000, 2001), Elliott (1997), Jain (1998), Rose-Ackerman (1999), Tanzi (1998).  
3 On the relationship between corruption and money laundering, see Carlson (2000).   
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Above all, corruption is becoming an international phenomenon in scope, substance and 
consequences.
4 Forms of corruption are imitated and transferred from one country to another. 
Because corrupt behavior is illegal, the proceeds of corruption often are transferred abroad, 
leading to international disputes involving companies (particularly banks) in different 
countries. Governments, international agencies, non-governmental organizations, aid donors 
and transnational corporations are naturally concerned about global aspects of corruption, 
ranging from the spread of criminal networks to the creation of unfair conditions for trade and 
finance.  
That is why, in recent years, there has been a proliferation of international efforts to tackle the 
problem of corruption. It is assumed that it is up to national governments to prevent and 
combat corruption in their own country. But broad-based international cooperation is needed 
to ensure that the measures adopted in different countries are consistent and fair and foster 
international relations and economic efficiency; to create an equitable framework for 
international relations; and also to ensure that governments have the means to tackle their 
national problems, which often they lack.  
One such international cooperative initiative is the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption, signed in 2003, which came into force in December 2005. This is the first truly 
global instrument to prevent and combat corruption, built on a broad international consensus. 
The purpose of this article is to explain the origin and content of the Convention, what it adds 
to existing international instruments for combating corruption, and its strengths and 
weaknesses, mainly from the point of view of companies. In the following section we explain 
how the initiative developed in the context of the other anti-corruption measures adopted by 
international organizations. The core of the article consists of an explanation of the main 
points of the Convention, considered specifically from the point of view of companies operating 
in world markets. We then discuss the Convention’s strengths and weaknesses, ending with the 
conclusions.  
            
Historical background
5 
The United Nations Convention against Corruption is one of a set of anti-corruption initiatives 
taken by international bodies over the last few years.
6 Exhibit 1 gives a brief overview of the 
international legal instruments adopted to date, and Exhibit 2 summarizes the main 
recommendations and other documents on the subject of corruption.
7 Added to these, are other 
United Nations initiatives adopted in ordinary meetings of the General Assembly
8 and at 
                                              
4 Cf. Glynn et al. (1997), Posada (2000), Rose-Ackerman (1997).  
5 Cf. “Report of the Ad Hoc Committee for the Negotiation of a Convention against Corruption on the work of its 
first to seventh sessions”, United Nations, General Assembly, A/58/422, October 7
th, 2003. Reports on the previous 
sessions of the Ad Hoc Committee have also been published.  Also, see Babu (2006), Vlassis (2002), Webb (2005). 
6 For a summary of some of these initiatives, see Babu (2006) and Webb (2005).  
7 Cf. “Existing international legal instruments, recommendations and other documents addressing corruption.  Report 
of the Secretary General”, Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, E/CN.15/2001/3, April 2
nd, 2001.     
8 Cf., for example, resolutions 54/205 of 22 December 1999, 55/25 of 15 November 2000, 56/186 of 21 December 
2001, 57/244 of  December 20
th 2002, 58/205 of  December 23
rd 2003, 59/242 of  December 22
nd 2004 and 60/207 of  
December 22
nd 2005.     
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international conferences such as Monterrey
9 and Johannesburg,
10 along with numerous 
initiatives by other public and private international organizations.
11  
The United Nations has been working on the prevention and eradication of corruption for a 
couple of decades.
12 The Convention against Corruption grew out of the “Vienna Declaration”, 
adopted by the 10th UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, 
held in April 2000, and the preparatory work for the UN Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime.
13 In December 1999, the General Assembly directed the Ad Hoc Committee on 
the Elaboration of a Convention against Transnational Organized Crime to incorporate into the 
draft convention measures against corruption linked to organized crime, including provisions 
regarding the sanctioning of acts of corruption involving public officials, either in the form of 
an annex to said convention or as a separate instrument.
14   
One year later, the United Nations General Assembly decided that it was desirable to have an 
international legal instrument against corruption independent of the UN Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime.
15 Shortly afterwards, the General Assembly invited the 
intergovernmental open-ended expert group convened for that purpose to examine also the 
question of illegally transferred funds and the repatriation of such funds to their countries of 
origin.
16 And in January 2002 it decided that the Ad Hoc Committee should negotiate a “broad 
and effective” convention, adopting a “comprehensive and multidisciplinary” approach that 
could be approved before the end of 2003.
17  
The Ad Hoc Committee for the negotiation of the Convention met officially for the first time in 
Buenos Aires, from December 4
th to 7
th, 2001. Between January 2002 and October 2003, seven 
official sessions were held in Vienna, at the headquarters of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC), with the participation of representatives of the States Parties
18 and observers from 
various agencies, research institutes, specialized UN bodies and other governmental and non-
governmental organizations. On 21 June 2002 a one-day technical seminar was held to discuss 
technical problems relating to asset recovery.  
                                              




10 Cf. “Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development”, Johannesburg, South African Union,  August 26
th 
- September 4
th 2002.  
11 Such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (2002), the Equator Principles for Financial Institutions 
(2005), the Wolfsberg Anti-Money-Laundering Principles for Private Banking (2000), the FIDIC Code of Ethics and 
Business Integrity Management System of the International Federation of Consulting Engineers, and the Sustainable 
Development Charter of the International Council on Mining and Metals (2002). There are also instruments to help 
companies organize themselves against corruption; for example, the ICC Rules of Conduct to Combat Extortion and 
Bribery (published by the International Chamber of Commerce in 1977 and revised on various occasions, the last 
time in 2005), the Business Principles for Countering Bribery (Transparency International), the World Economic 
Forum’s Partnership against Corruption Initiative (launched in January 2004), the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises (revised in 2000), etc. See also Vincke and Heimann (2003).  
12 Examples of actions include the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials (1979), the Manual of Practical 
Measures against Corruption (1990), the Basic Principles on the role of Lawyers (1990), the International Code of 
Conduct for Public Officials (1996) and the Declaration on Crime and Public Security (1996). Cf. Babu (2006). 
13 Resolution 55/25, Annex II; which came into force on September 19 2003.   
14 Resolution 54/128, of December 17
th, 1999. 
15 Resolution 55/61, of December 4
th, 2000.    
16 Resolution 55/188, of December 20
th, 2000.  
17 Resolution 56/260, of January 31
st, 2002.  
18 Between 97 and 128 States, depending on the meeting.   
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The Ad Hoc Committee approved the draft Convention on October 1
st, 2003,
19 and presented it 
to the General Assembly, which adopted it on October 31
st, 2003.
20 The Convention was 
presented to a high-level political signing conference hosted by the government of Mexico, in 
Merida, on December 9
th-11
th, 2003. On December 10
th, 95 countries signed the Convention.
21  
To come into force, the Convention had to be ratified by at least thirty countries. Ratification 
implies a commitment to take whatever legislative and administrative measures are needed to 
make the Convention effective and give it official support. In accordance with its art. 68, the 
UN Convention against Corruption came into force on December 14
th, 2005. By July 2006, 140 
States Parties had signed the Convention and had presented the ratification instruments.
22  
Once the Convention comes into force, a Conference of States Parties must be called within one 
year “to achieve the objectives set forth in this Convention and to promote and review its 
implementation” (art. 63.1). Also, the States Parties must verify that their legislation is in line 
with what is established in the Convention and, if necessary, pass new laws or amend existing 
ones, create the bodies envisaged in the Convention, and endow them with the necessary means 
to perform their functions.   
Content of the Convention 
The Convention against Corruption is the first genuinely global, legally binding instrument on 
corruption and related matters, that is, the first to be developed with an extensive international 
participation and with a broad consensus of signatory States and international private sector 
and civil society organizations. Consequently, it must be accepted, or is expected to be 
accepted, by the great majority of countries in the international community, so that the fight 
against corruption will be seen in a new, global (as opposed to regional) perspective. This is 
precisely what differentiates this Convention from the other instruments available. 
The purpose of the Convention is to prevent corrupt practices and illicit fund transfer, and 
combat these practices effectively; to criminalize and repress corrupt practices; to promote, 
facilitate and support international cooperation and technical assistance; to return illegally 
transferred funds to their countries of origin; and to promote integrity, accountability and 
proper management of public affairs and public property.
23 
The Convention is thus intended to be a comprehensive, functional and effective international 
instrument that takes into account the many facets of corruption and that establishes a 
common language and guidelines to unify international legislation in this area, with the right 
balance of prevention and prosecution. At the same time, the Convention acknowledges certain 
fundamental limitations in its approach and content, namely, the recognition of State 
sovereignty; the inevitable and legitimate legal, cultural, social and political differences 
between States Parties; and their different levels of economic development.  
                                              
19 Report A/58/422 and Annex.  
20 Resolution 58/4 of October 31
st, 2003, and Annex. To promote the fight against corruption, it was agreed that 
December 9
th  would be “International Anti-Corruption Day” (Resolution 58/4 of October 31
st, 2003, no. 7).  
21 The signature we are referring to is not the deposit of the instrument of ratification of the Convention. Kenya was 
the first country to sign and at the time of signing also deposited the instrument of ratification.   
22 Verified at the UN Office on Drugs and Crime’s web site on July 5
th, 2006. At that date, it is significant that only a 
small number of advanced countries had ratified their signature: Austria, Finland, France, Latvia, Slovakia, Spain 
and the United Kingdom, from the European Union, plus Norway and Australia.  
23 Cf. art. 1.   
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The Convention does not contain a list of the legal and moral principles that inspire it. 
Nevertheless, its articles contain references to the principles of proper management of public 
affairs and public property (art. 7);
24 integrity, transparency, responsibility and accountability 
(arts. 7 and 10); rule of law, equality before the law, equity, independence of the judiciary (art. 
11); due process of law in criminal proceedings and in civil or administrative proceedings; 
presumption of innocence (art. 30); recognition of sovereign equality and territorial integrity of 
States (art. 4) and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other States (art. 4), etc.    
The Convention consists of a preamble and 71 articles, grouped in eight chapters (see Exhibit 3). 
In what follows there is no attempt to explain the whole of the document, only some of the 
more important aspects. First we shall discuss definitions, before moving on to preventive 
measures, the criminalization of corruption, international cooperation and asset recovery, 
paying particular attention to the behavior of companies and other private organizations.    
Definitions 
Some of the States that submitted proposals for the draft Convention wanted to have clear and 
rigorous definitions established for the most important terms. This was done only in part.
25  
First, it was decided that the text of the Convention would not include a definition of 
corruption, as this is a polyvalent and changeable term that means different things to different 
people, and above all because it is an evolving concept.
26 In other parts of the Convention there 
are definitions of some of the main types of corruption, such as bribery (active) and extortion 
(passive bribery), both of public officials
27 (art. 15) and in the private sector (art. 21), 
embezzlement, misappropriation of funds and other diversion of property (arts. 17 and 22), 
trading in influence (art. 18), abuse of functions (art. 19) and illicit enrichment (art. 20). The 
authors of the Convention preferred to offer this broad spectrum of offences, rather than a 
definition of corruption, so as to allow greater flexibility for future implementations and 
interpretations.    
A “public official” is defined as: “(i) any person holding a legislative, executive, administrative 
or judicial office [...], whether appointed or elected, whether permanent or temporary, whether 
paid or unpaid [...]; (ii) any other person who performs a public function, including for a public 
agency or public enterprise, or provides a public service, as defined in the domestic law of the 
State Party [...]; (iii) any other person defined as a ‘public official’ in the domestic law of a State 
Party” (art. 2, a).
28 
                                              
24 This includes, for example, establishing objective criteria of merit, equity and aptitude in the selection, hiring, 
remuneration and promotion of public officials (art. 7).  
25  It seems a good thing that the Convention should contain clear and precise definitions in order to unify 
terminology and the interpretation of terms in the different national legislations.  
26 Some countries proposed definitions of “corruption”; see, for example, Peru’s proposal to the Preparatory Meeting 
of the Ad Hoc Committee for the Negotiation of a Convention against Corruption, A/AC.261/IPM/11, November 12
th, 
2001, no. 6, 2 and 3, and the Philippines’ proposal, A/AC.261/IPM/24, of  December 7
th, 2001, no. 4.  
27 Active bribery: “The promise, offering or giving, to a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, 
for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in 
the exercise of his or her official duties” (art. 15, a). Passive bribery or extortion: “The solicitation or acceptance by a 
public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or 
entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties” (art. 15, b).   
28 “Foreign public official” (art. 2, b) and “official of an international public organization” (art. 2, c) are also defined.  
6 -  IESE Business School-University of Navarra 
The concept of “property”, for the purpose of the Convention, is broad: “assets of every kind, 
whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, tangible or intangible, and legal 
documents or instruments evidencing title to or interest in such assets” (art. 2, d).
29      
Preventive measures 
As explained, the Convention puts the emphasis on measures to prevent corruption from 
appearing in the first place (chapter II, arts. 5 to 14). It is left to each State’s discretion to 
implement effective anti-corruption policies (art. 5) and create organizations specifically to fight 
corruption (art. 6). States must endeavor to ensure that their public services are subject to 
safeguards that promote integrity, transparency and accountability among civil servants and 
hiring based on efficiency and merit (art. 7). Once hired, public officials must be subject to codes 
of conduct (art. 8), including measures such as declarations of assets, and disciplinary measures. 
States must also promote transparency and accountability in public procurement and 
management of public finances (art. 9), and must take measures to preserve integrity in especially 
critical areas such as the judiciary and prosecution services (art. 11), and to prevent money 
laundering (art. 14).
30  
Art. 12 is devoted to anti-corruption measures in the private sector. It seems clear that 
achieving high moral and legal standards in relations with government is impossible unless 
companies also adopt high standards, for themselves and for their dealings with one another. 
Art. 12, 2 proposes measures including cooperation between law enforcement agencies and 
relevant private entities; instruments to safeguard the integrity of relevant private entities, such 
as codes of conduct; transparency; prevention of the misuse of procedures regulating private 
entities; prevention of conflicts of interest; and internal auditing controls, including auditing 
and certification procedures. The specific measures proposed in art. 12, 3 and 4, include the 
promotion of internationally accepted accounting and auditing standards, the prohibition of 
off-the-books transactions, and the disallowance of the tax deductibility of expenses that 
constitute bribes.  
The Convention also advocates the participation of civil society in the prevention of and fight 
against corruption (art. 13, 1), including access to the appropriate administrative and judicial 
bodies (art. 13, 2), reporting to the national investigating and prosecuting authorities (art. 39, 2), 
and the protection of reporting persons (art. 33) and of witnesses, experts and victims (art. 32).   
Criminalization of corruption 
Chapter III develops the theme of criminalization and law enforcement, which, together with 
preventive measures, is another of the basic pillars of the Convention. The States Parties must 
take legislative measures to establish as criminal offences not only active and passive bribery of 
national public officials (art. 15), but also active bribery of foreign public officials or officials 
of public international organizations (art. 16, 1). Other offences that do not appear in other 
international instruments are mentioned: embezzlement, misappropriation and other diversion 
of property by a public official (art. 17), money laundering (art. 23), obstruction of justice (art. 
                                              
29  Other definitions included are those of “proceeds of crime” (art. 2, e), “freezing” or “seizure” (art. 2, f), 
“confiscation” (art. 2, g), “predicate offence” (art. 2, h) and “controlled delivery” (art. 2, i). 
30 The Convention makes no reference to important measures for the correct functioning of the preventive policies, 
such as press freedom or the existence of an effective democracy, probably because of their political content and 
significance.   
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25), and participation as an accomplice, assistant or instigator in an offence of corruption, or 
any attempt to commit such an offence (art. 27, 1 and 2).
31  
Other acts that are considered criminal offences in certain States Parties are also included in the 
Convention, but are not mandatory:
32 solicitation or acceptance by a foreign public official of 
an undue advantage (art. 16, 2), trading in influence (art. 18), abuse of functions (art. 19), illicit 
enrichment (art. 20), concealment (art. 24) and preparation for an offence of corruption (art. 27, 
3). The possibility of making bribery in the private sector
33 (art. 21) and embezzlement in the 
private sector (art. 22)
34 criminal offences is included as an option.   
Although the offences envisaged in the Convention are invariably committed by individuals, 
legal persons (companies, for example) often play a decisive role, both in preparing the offences 
and in executing them, exploiting their results and laundering the proceeds. Accordingly, art. 
26 establishes that the States Parties shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish 
the criminal, civil or administrative liability of legal persons for participation in offences. The 
Convention also establishes that entities or persons who have suffered damage as a result of an 
act of corruption have the right to initiate legal proceedings against those responsible for that 
damage (art. 35).  
International cooperation, technical assistance and information exchange 
One of the main purposes of the Convention is to promote international cooperation in 
preventing, investigating and combating corruption and prosecuting criminals (chapter IV, arts. 
43-50). It contains provisions on extradition, mutual legal assistance, joint investigations, etc., 
so that the guilty parties may be prosecuted in any country and cannot escape justice. Another 
goal is to foster technical assistance and information exchange, especially as regards States 
Parties with scant resources and experience in these matters (chapter VI, arts. 60-62). 
Asset recovery 
A “fundamental principle” (art. 51) of the Convention, and one of its main novelties compared 
with other similar instruments, is the right to asset recovery, set out in chapter V (arts. 51 to 
59). In many cases, the money illicitly paid to public officials (or managers or employees of 
private organizations) is sent abroad, resulting in a drain of funds which, in some cases, can 
seriously affect a country’s economic development. Accordingly, the Convention details the 
conditions, processes and means for those funds to be returned to their countries of origin. This 
                                              
31  The “dual criminality” criterion, when this is a requirement for international cooperation, “shall be deemed 
fulfilled irrespective of whether the laws of the requested State Party place the offence within the same category of 
offence or denominate the offence by the same terminology as the requesting State Party, if the conduct underlying 
the offence for which assistance is sought is a criminal offence under the laws of both States Parties” (art. 43, 2).   
32 For example: “Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as 
a criminal offence...” (art. 16, 2).  
33 In the case of private corruption, too, a distinction is made between bribery (“The promise, offering or giving, 
directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage to any person who directs or works, in any capacity, for a private 
sector entity, for the person himself or herself or for another person, in order that he or she, in breach of his or her 
duties, act or refrain from acting…”, art. 21, a) and extortion (“The solicitation or acceptance, directly or indirectly, of 
an undue advantage by any person who directs or works, in any capacity, for a private sector entity, for the person 
himself or herself or for another person, in order that he or she, in breach of his or her duties, act or refrain from 
acting…”, art. 21, b).   
34 The opposition of some States to mandatory criminalization of private corruption was due to the fear that such 
legislation would be used to restrict trade and foreign investment.   
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entailed lengthy negotiations, taking into account not only the demands of the countries that 
sought to recover their assets, but also the legal and procedural safeguards of the countries that 
had received the funds.   
Chapter V of the Convention establishes the means to prevent and detect transfers of the 
proceeds of crime (art. 52) through measures affecting financial institutions (paras. 1-4) and 
public officials (paras. 5-6); measures for the direct recovery of property (art. 53); mechanisms 
for the recovery of property through international cooperation (arts. 54-56 and 58-59) and 
measures for the return and disposal of assets (art. 57).  
Art. 57 distinguishes three different situations. 1) Embezzlement of public funds by a public 
official, who tries to conceal them in another country. In this case, the property clearly belongs 
to the State and must be returned to its rightful owner (art. 57, 3, a). 2) Proceeds of corruption, 
that is, property that was not stolen (in fact, was given voluntarily to the corrupt public 
official), but was obtained illicitly and transferred to another country. In this case, the State of 
origin may or may not be the victim. The Convention establishes a criterion similar to that 
applied in the confiscation of money from drug trafficking or other crimes: the proceeds of the 
crime must be returned to the State of origin when said State is able to reasonably establish its 
prior ownership or when it has suffered damage and is entitled to compensation (art. 57, 3, b), 
always taking into account the rights of bona fide third parties (art. 57, 2). 3) All other cases of 
confiscation, where priority consideration is to be given to returning confiscated property to the 
requesting State Party or to its prior legitimate owners or compensating the victims of the crime 
(art. 57, 3, c).
35    
Lights and shadows of the Convention 
The United Nations Convention against Corruption already occupies an important place in the 
international community’s efforts to overcome the human, moral, political, economic and social 
problems derived from corruption. As we pointed out earlier, this is the first truly global 
instrument against corruption, combining prevention and criminalization, with a strong 
emphasis on international cooperation, and offering governments a consistent framework, so 
that all efforts tend in the same direction. In scope it goes beyond other similar instruments. 
The criminalization of extortion of public officials (art. 15), for example, considerably extends 
the scope of the OECD Convention. 
It remains a limited instrument, however: firstly, because of the way it was drafted, with a 
tendency to give priority to political and economic interests, besides human, legal and moral 
interests;
36 and secondly, because of its content. 
Indeed, the Convention imposes no obligation on signatory countries to criminalize certain acts, 
such as passive bribery of a foreign public official, trading in influence, abuse of public 
functions or illicit enrichment. It contains a number of provisions that each State Party “shall 
adopt”, others that each State Party “shall consider adopting” (or things they “shall endeavor to 
                                              
35 Canada formulated a detailed proposal, considering, among other things, the three situations presented in art. 57. 
Cf. Canada’s proposal to the Informal Preparatory Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee for the Negotiation of a 
Convention against Corruption, A/AC.261/IPM/27, December 7
th, 2001.  
36 Some governments of developed countries took a restrictive attitude, probably to avoid the problems that could 
arise from legal proceedings against their citizens in countries with backward legal systems and without sufficient 
guarantees of human rights or fair procedure.   
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do”), and others that they “may adopt”. Also, some articles contain safeguard clauses that limit 
the States Parties’ obligation in the event of conflict with their constitution or the fundamental 
principles of their legal system. This means that one of the goals of the Convention, which is to 
create common standards in countries’ legislation, may not be achieved.  
The fact that there is no obligation to make bribery and embezzlement in the private sector a 
criminal offence deserves special mention, because, in many countries, the line between private 
and public sector is blurred, especially in the context of globalization, outsourcing and 
privatization of state-owned companies.
37 Tolerance of private corruption inevitably makes it 
more difficult to prevent and combat public corruption.
38  
Nor is it obligatory under the Convention to make corruption in political party funding a 
criminal offence. In fact, the whole issue is dealt with only sketchily and in passing in the text 
of the Convention,
39 despite the fact that this is a widespread form of corruption.
40 This is 
probably partly because of the diversity of situations in different countries when it comes to 
financing political campaigns and parties.
41 The problem lies in how to limit politicians’ power 
to favor donors, rather than in the fact, amount or transparency of donations as such.  
The criminalization of bribery of officials of public international organizations and other 
related issues was left for discussion by the Conference of the States Parties to the Convention, 
to be held after the Convention comes into force.
42 
Some articles are vague and lend themselves to varied interpretations, which may create 
complicated situations for companies that operate in many different countries (examples 
include art. 18 on trading in influence; art. 20 on illicit enrichment; and art. 35 on 
compensation for damage).
43  
Another major shortcoming of the Convention is the absence of any mechanism to punish 
States Parties that do not fulfill their obligations under the Convention: the problem of 
implementation and enforcement. This is related to the absence of monitoring and surveillance 
mechanisms involving representatives of civil society, companies, unions, etc.
44 Such 
mechanisms are decisive for the success or failure of an instrument such as the Convention.
45 
                                              
37 Cf. Argandoña (2003b). 
38 Webb (2005) attributes this treatment of private corruption to the opposition of the United States, which was 
afraid that it would open the door to legal action against U.S. managers in other countries.  
39 “Each State Party shall also consider taking appropriate legislative and administrative measures […] to enhance 
transparency in the funding of candidatures for elected public office and, where applicable, the funding of political 
parties” (art. 7, 3). The concept of the public official (art. 2) does not include those who manage political parties or 
work in them.   
40 Again it was the United States that led the opposition to the inclusion of party funding. Cf. Webb (2005).  
41 Cf. Argandoña (2003a).  
42 Resolution 58/4, no. 6. The Conference of the States Parties is established in art. 63. The reasons for this delay 
have to do mainly with the privileges and immunities of the officials of these bodies and the bodies’ jurisdiction and 
functions.  
43 Michael (2004) attempts to quantify the ambiguity of the various articles of the Convention, and concludes that it 
is very high. However, a degree of ambiguity is necessary, first in the negotiation phase to facilitate consensus, and 
then in the implementation phase to adapt the provisions to the peculiarities of different countries and changing 
circumstances.  
44 Various countries proposed that a monitoring system should be established: Argentina, Austria, Benin, Cameroon, 
Holland, Norway, etc.  
45 Cf. Quinones (2000).   
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The main purpose of monitoring mechanisms is to encourage governments first to ratify the 
Convention and then put it into practice. This is important given the numerous political, social, 
economic and technical obstacles to its implementation: new laws have to be passed; the 
resistance of those who stand to lose from changes in the law has to be overcome; the agencies 
that are to enforce the new provisions need to be staffed and funded, etc. The experience of 
other initiatives already under way (OECD, Council of Europe, Organization of American States) 
has been highly positive, so the delay in implementing monitoring mechanisms in this case 
already indicates a lack of political will and a curb on the fight against corruption.
46 
The monitoring process imposes an external discipline on governments, through reports, 
inspector visits, and reporting and discussion sessions. It creates a forum of governments and 
pressure groups and allows civil society and the private sector to participate in these tasks.
47 
There are other possible favorable effects in the medium term, such as improvement in the 
quality of legislative and institutional change, increased participation by civil society 
(companies, business associations, unions, non-governmental organizations, media, etc.) in the 
fight against corruption, the recording of good practices and experiences from other countries, 
and the compilation of a body of case law to aid consistent interpretation of the Convention.  
Given the diversity of the parties to the Convention and the attitude of some of them during the 
negotiations, arguing that the monitoring processes violated their sovereignty, it was particularly 
difficult to agree on an effective monitoring procedure that was acceptable to all. The task of 
supervision and monitoring will be carried out, in principle, through the Conference of States 
Parties to the Convention. The Conference will be held for the first time “not later than one year 
following the entry into force of the Convention” (art. 63, 2). One of its tasks will be to “review 
periodically the implementation of this Convention by its States Parties” (art. 63, 4, e).   
The monitoring process is to be understood as a long-term program that will need to be 
adapted to changing circumstances and the parties’ learning progress. It must have a high rate 
of State Party participation and an efficient, properly resourced Secretariat. As part of this 
process, it is important to promote the collection and publication of information about anti-
corruption measures in the different countries, so as to add transparency to the various stages 
of the process.
48 Realistic limits must be set as to what can be achieved (also from the point of 
view of the economic cost of monitoring). And the States Parties must build political support 
for the process (combining it, for example, with the technical assistance envisaged in the 
Convention) and exploit the synergies with the other monitoring instruments mentioned 
earlier.
49  
                                              
46 An example of this supervisory work is the “Mid-term study of phase 2 reports. Application of the Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and the 1997 Recommendation 
on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions”, Paris: OECD, Working Group on Bribery in 
International Business Transactions,  May 22
nd, 2006.      
47 Cf. Heimann (2005 a,b).   
48 It is important to establish a system of indicators that measure progress to date. See Argentina’s proposal to the 
Preparatory Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee for the Negotiation of a Convention against Corruption, 
A/AC.261/IPM/6, November  12
th, 2001, no. 7.  
49 This is stated indirectly in art. 63, 4, d. There are various possible channels of coordination with, for example, the 
processes of the OECD, the Council of Europe or the Organization of American States: information exchange between 
the respective teams, specialization of each team in different areas, etc. In this connection, points in common 
between countries (language, culture, legal system, etc.) may facilitate regional monitoring – which would also 
facilitate acceptance of any recommendations that were made.     
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Conclusions 
The United Nations Convention against Corruption is an international instrument that has 
aroused interest and enthusiasm. If implemented successfully, it is likely to have a major impact 
on the prevention of and fight against corruption in the international arena, promoting 
national actions, creating a common framework and organizing cooperation among the States 
Parties. Furthermore, its approach and scope are ambitious; it has won the support of many 
countries in the drafting and signing phase (though only a small number of developed countries 
have actually ratified it so far); and it was negotiated on good terms, with intense United 
Nations involvement and in a short time. But it is only the first step in what should be a 
promising development. Its long-term success cannot be guaranteed, mainly because, at least 
for the time being, it lacks an effective mechanism to promote implementation and monitoring.  
Insofar as it is effective, it will have a significant impact on companies, on a national level and 
worldwide, changing the framework in which they operate, making it clearer and more 
homogenous. It may also help to create an anti-corruption culture, involving not only 
governments, government agencies and public officials but, above all, companies and civil 
society.
50  
The Convention has some undoubted plus points, such as its condemnation of corruption, 
active and passive, public and private; the combination of prevention and criminalization; the 
emphasis on international cooperation and technical assistance, so that all countries are able to 
implement the Convention consistently and rigorously; and a viable mechanism for the return 
of the proceeds of corruption to their legitimate owner, or at least to their country of origin.
51 
But it also has its minus points, some of which have been pointed out in this article. Everything 
now will depend on how the Convention is implemented, although the scant interest shown by 
the developed countries in ratifying it casts a shadow of doubt over the likely outcome.     
           
           
                                              
50 Cf. Vlassis (2005).  
51 Cf. “ICC views on the UN Convention against Corruption”, 194/44, May 12
th, 2005, Babu (2006), Webb (2005).   
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Exhibit 1 
Main international legal instruments on corruption
52 
United Nations 
United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime, Resolution 55/25 of November 
15
th, 2000. Signed by 147 countries; ratified by 122 countries (as of July 5
th, 2006); came into 
force on September 29
th, 2003 and requires corruption of public officials to be established as a 
criminal offence.   
Council of Europe 
Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, approved by the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe; opened to signing on January 27
th, 1999. The Convention 
deals with the crimes of active and passive bribery of public officials, active and passive trading 
in influence, laundering of the proceeds of corruption, accounting crimes linked to corruption, 
active and passive bribery in the private sector, and facilitation and complicity in these crimes. 
The Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) monitors implementation of the Convention. 
Civil Law Convention on Corruption of the Council of Europe, opened for signature by the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on November 4
th, 1999. This was the first 
attempt to define common international civil law rules on corruption.  
European Union (EU) 
Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union (EU) on the 
protection of the European Communities’ financial interests, adopted by the EU Council on July 
26
th, 1995. It deals with fraud affecting the European Union’s financial interests.  
Protocol drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union on the 
protection of the European Communities’ financial interests, adopted by the EU Council on 
September 27
th, 1996. It addresses, among others things, active and passive corruption 
involving national and Community officials that may damage the European Communities’ 
financial interests. 
Second Protocol drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union on the 
protection of the European Communities’ financial interests, adopted by the Council on June 
19
th, 1997, addresses  the issue of money laundering.  
Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 (2) (c) of the Treaty on European Union on the 
fight against corruption involving officials of the European Communities or officials of member 
States of the European Union, adopted by the EU Council on  May 26
th, 1997, deals with active 
and passive corruption of officials.  
 
                                              
52  Cf. “Existing international legal instruments, recommendations and other documents addressing corruption.   
Report of the Secretary General”.  Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, E/CN.15/2001/3, April 2
nd, 
2001. On some of these documents, cf. Corr and Lawler (1999), George et al. (2000), Low et al. (1998), Pacini et al. 
(2002),   
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Exhibit 1 (continued) 
Joint Action of  December 22
nd, 1998, adopted by the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the 
Treaty on European Union on corruption in the private sector. Directed, in particular, at 
combating active and passive corruption in the private sector.  
Organization of American States (OAS) 
Inter-American Convention against Corruption, approved at a Special Inter-American 
Conference on March 29
th, 1996, deals with corruption of national public officials, bribery of 
foreign public officials and illicit enrichment.  
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)    
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, signed on December 17
th, 1997, addresses the issue of bribery of foreign public 
officials. This Convention and the Recommendation on Combating Bribery in International 
Business Transactions are monitored by the OECD Working Group on Bribery in International 
Business Transactions.  
African Union  
African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption and Related Offences, 
approved on July 12
th, 2003.  
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Exhibit 2 
Other international documents on corruption
53 
United Nations 
International Code of Conduct for Public Officials of December 1996, General Assembly, 
Resolution 51/59, annex. The Code deals with principles and recommendations for combating 
corruption.  
United Nations Declaration against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial 
Transactions, General Assembly Resolution 51/91, annex. Includes a set of measures that 
countries can implement to combat corruption. 
Conclusions and Recommendations of the Expert Group Meeting on Corruption and its Financial 
Channels, Paris, March 30
th - April 1
st, 1999, E/CN.15/1999/10. Measures to improve 
cooperation. 
Action against corruption, General Assembly resolution 54/128. Suggests measures. 
Report of the 10th United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of 
Offenders, held in Vienna from April 10
th to 17
th, 2000. Includes the Vienna Declaration on 
Crime and Justice: Meeting the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century, and the Report of the 
workshop on combating corruption. 
Tenth principle of the United Nations Global Pact, proposed by the UN Secretary General on 
June 24
th, 2004, at the first Global Pact Leaders Summit in New York. Contains certain 
principles that companies signing the Pact accept voluntarily.  
Council of Europe 
Twenty Guiding Principles for the Fight against Corruption, developed by the Multidisciplinary 
Group on Corruption and approved by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, 
Resolution (97) 24, on  November 6
th, 1997. These are fundamental directives that member 
States are called upon to implement in their efforts against corruption.  
Model code of conduct for public officials, a recommendation adopted by the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe, on  May 11
th, 2000, includes recommendations and a model 
code. 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)    
Revised Recommendation on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions, adopted 
by the OECD Council on May 23
rd, 1997, revising the 1994 Recommendation on Bribery in 
International Business Transactions.   
 
                                              
53  Cf. “Existing international legal instruments, recommendations and other documents addressing corruption.   
Report of the Secretary General”.  Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, E/CN.15/2001/3, April 2
nd, 
2001.      
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Exhibit 2 (continued) 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
Prevention of criminal use of the banking system for the purpose of money-laundering (1998). 
Guidance for financial institutions. 
Core principles for effective banking supervision (1997) and Core principles methodology (1999). 
Guidance for banks. 
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering 
Forty recommendations, developed in 1990 and revised in 1996. The recommendations cover 
money laundering. 
Global Coalition for Africa 
Twenty-five principles to combat corruption, signed on February 23
rd, 1999 by representatives 
of various African countries.    
Global Forum on Fighting Corruption 
Guiding principles, approved at the First Forum World against Corruption, held from to 
February 24
th to 26
th, 1999 in Washington. 
Group of Eight 
Forty recommendations to combat transnational organized crime, prepared by a Senior Experts 
Group in April 1996. 
Asian Development Bank
54 
Asian Development Bank – Organization for the Economic Cooperation and Development Anti-
corruption Initiative for Asia and the Pacific, adopted in Manila in October 1999. It includes 
recommendations and a voluntary government action plan.
55  
  
                                              
54 Cf. Asian Development Bank, “Anti-corruption Action Plan for Asia and the Pacific”, Tokyo, 2001. 
55  “Technical Assistance for the Implementation of the ADB-OECD Anti-corruption Initiative for Asia and the 
Pacific”, Asian Development Bank, TAR:OTH 37476, November 2004.  
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Exhibit 3 
United Nations Convention against Corruption: Chapters and Articles’ List 
Preamble 
Chapter I: General provisions  
Art. 1.  Statement of purpose 
Art. 2.  Use of terms 
Art. 3.  Scope of application 
Art. 4.  Protection of sovereignty  
Chapter II: Preventive measures 
Art. 5.  Preventive anti-corruption policies and practices  
Art. 6.  Preventive anti-corruption body or bodies 
Art. 7.  Public sector 
Art. 8.  Codes of conduct for public officials  
Art. 9.  Public procurement and management of public finances 
Art. 10. Public reporting 
Art. 11. Measures related to the judiciary and prosecution services 
Art. 12. Private sector 
Art. 13. Participation of society 
Art. 14. Measures to prevent money-laundering 
Chapter III: Criminalization and law enforcement 
Art. 15. Bribery of national public officials 
Art. 16. Bribery of foreign public officials and officials of public international organizations 
Art. 17. Embezzlement, misappropriation or other diversion of property by a public official 
Art. 18. Trading in influence 
Art. 19. Abuse of functions 
Art. 20. Illicit enrichment  
Art. 21. Bribery in the private sector 
Art. 22. Embezzlement of property in the private sector 
Art. 23. Laundry of proceeds of crime 
Art. 24. Concealment 
Art. 25. Obstruction of justice 
Art. 26. Liability of legal persons 
Art. 27. Participation and attempt 
Art. 28. Knowledge, intention and purpose as elements of an offence 
Art. 29. Statute of limitations 
Art. 30. Prosecution, adjudication and sanctions  
Art. 31. Freezing, seizure and confiscation 
Art. 32. Protection of witnesses, experts and victims 
Art. 33. Protection of reporting persons 
Art. 34. Consequences of acts of corruption 
Art. 35. Compensation for damage 
Art. 36. Specialized authorities  
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Exhibit 3 (continued) 
 
Art. 37. Cooperation with law enforcement authorities 
Art. 38. Cooperation between national authorities 
Art. 39. Cooperation between national authorities and the private sector 
Art. 40. Bank secrecy 
Art. 41. Criminal record  
Art. 42. Jurisdiction  
Chapter IV: International cooperation  
Art. 43. International cooperation 
Art. 44. Extradition 
Art. 45. Transfer of sentenced persons 
Art. 46. Mutual legal assistance 
Art. 47. Transfer of criminal proceedings  
Art. 48. Law enforcement cooperation 
Art. 49. Joint investigations 
Art. 50. Special investigative techniques  
Chapter V: Asset recovery 
Art. 51. General provision 
Art. 52. Prevention and detection of transfers of proceeds of crime 
Art. 53. Measures for direct recovery of property 
Art. 54. Mechanism for recovery of property through international cooperation in confiscation 
Art. 55. International cooperation for purposes of confiscation 
Art. 56. Special cooperation 
Art. 57. Return and disposal of assets  
Art. 58. Financial intelligence unit 
Art. 59. Bilateral and multilateral agreements and arrangements  
Chapter VI: Technical assistance and information exchange 
Art. 60. Training and technical assistance 
Art. 61. Collection, exchange and analysis of information on corruption 
Art. 62. Other measures: implementation of the Convention through economic development and 
technical assistance 
Chapter VII: Mechanisms for implementation  
Art. 63. Conference of the States Parties to the Convention  
Art. 64. Secretariat   
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Exhibit 3 (continued) 
Chapter VIII: Final provisions 
Art. 65. Implementation of the Convention  
Art. 66. Settlement of disputes 
Art. 67. Signature, ratification, acceptance, approval and accession  
Art. 68. Entry into force 
Art. 69. Amendment  
Art. 70. Denunciation 
Art. 71. Depositary and languages  
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